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Abstract—The number of interconnected devices is growing
constantly due to rapid digitalization, thus providing attackers
with a larger attack surface. Particularly in critical infrastruc-
tures and manufacturing, where processes can be observed and
controlled remotely, successful attacks could lead to high costs
and damage. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate Industrial
Control System (ICS) devices like Programmable Logic Con-
trollers (PLCs) to make these sectors more secure. One possible
attack vector is the exploitation of the network communication
of devices. Thus, a robust communication system is essential to
ensure security. Unfortunately, the high demand for real-world
ICSs makes it difficult to assess component security during its
runtime. However, this is possible in a research testbed where
tests could be done and analyzed in a safe environment. In this
paper, we introduce our testbed and measurement methods for
communication robustness test research of ICS components.
Index Terms—testbed, industrial control system, communica-
tion robustness test
I. INTRODUCTION
Digitization is happening steadily, meaning that more and
more devices are getting interconnected. This trend of con-
nected devices can be observed also in industrial environments
and in critical infrastructure sectors. Consequently, the attack
surface over networks is also growing constantly. A successful
attack on industrial plants such as critical infrastructures
results in high costs and damage. Hence, the security of
the devices used in these applications must be ensured and
should be provided by the devices themselves. Owing to
remote access, security audits should also focus on robust and
secure network communication. However, a penetration test in
a real-world production environment could lead to damage and
outage. Therefore, to analyze the communication robustness of
these components, a testbed is necessary.
There are already a lot of testbeds for Industrial Control
System (ICS) security research. Holm et al. [1] have analyzed
30 ICS testbeds in 2015. However, these mostly focus on
analyzing a complete ICS infrastructure, as opposed to testing
single components.
In this paper, we present our testbed, focusing on the
security of industrial components, especially the robustness of
communication, which can influence the control behavior. The
following requirements for the testbed, with corresponding
measurement methods, have been defined:
• Network capture: The generated network traffic during
attacks and tests must be captured for further investiga-
tion.
• Network reachability check: It must be probed if the
devices are reachable within the network during attacks.
• Electrical monitoring: The electrical outputs must be
monitored to recognize changes in the control behavior.
• Fast integration: The integration of new devices into the
testbed must be easy and fast.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, an overview of the testbed is given. The devices currently
deployed in the testbed are described in Section III. Security
tests, which can be done with CoRT, are explained in Section
IV. Finally, a conclusion is provided in Section V.
II. CORT TESTBED
A communication robustness test measures the steadiness
of control signals under various communication parameters
and loads. Fig. 1 shows our testbed divided into two identical
racks, enabling comparison of the results.
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Fig. 1. Picture of the Testbed Built into Racks
At the bottom are the Devices under Test (DuTs), such
as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Human Machine
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Interfaces (HMIs), and bus couplers. The electrical outputs of
these are wired to a logic analyzer. All DuTs are intercon-
nected with a network switch to a server. Furthermore, there
is a monitor built in to keep tabs on the analyzed data. The
DuTs are mounted on an EN 50022 rail, which is commonly
used in the industrial sector. Both racks are lockable and have
wheels for easy transportation.
A. Attacker Model
This testbed is focused on, but not limited to, two attacker
models: a) an attacker who has remote access to the network
and b) an attacker who has local access to the ICS components
with basic knowledge. Both of them are able to inject network
traffic, e.g. to send commands or perform a Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) attack. Attacker model b is furthermore able to locally
manipulate input signals and has direct network access to the
DuT.
B. Robustness of Devices
The robustness of an Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
device is essential, because they mostly control machines and
interact with their environment. Therefore, an outage or loss
of control creates a problem. With the CoRT, the research
question of how network communication could influence the
robustness of industrial systems can be analyzed. The commu-
nication robustness of different industrial components can be
measured with fuzz testing frameworks. Besides, these must
be specialized for proprietary protocol fuzzing in ICSs, such
as PropFuzz [2].
C. Schematic Overview of the Testbed
Fig. 2 gives a schematic overview of the testbed compo-
nents. On the server, there are three Virtual Machines (VMs)
for measuring, programming, and attacking the DuTs. In
order not to influence the measurement, this separation is
necessary, because some attack tools produce a high system
load. Furthermore, additional attack tools and further DuTs
could be integrated into the testbed.
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Fig. 2. Schematic Overview of the Testbed
The DuTs are powered by 24V, which can be switched on
and off remotely by the measurement VM. With the logic
analyzer, the critical control part is observed.
D. Electrical Behavior
To measure the robustness of the DuTs, the electrical
outputs are observed with a logic analyzer. All PLCs are con-
figured to toggle every single cycle, resulting in a frequency
between 20Hz and 20kHz depending on the device. These
signals are measured with a logic analyzer and logged on the
measurement VM. For the logic analyzer task, a BeagleBone
Green running Beaglelogic [3] with a custom Printed Circuit
Board (PCB) is used. Using BeagleLogic, it is possible to
measure a sample frequency up to 100MHz. Fig. 3 shows the
adapter board designed by us.
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Fig. 3. Rendered Image of the PCB of the Logic Adapter Board
This is necessary to measure up to 30V and convert it to
the 3.3V input signal of the BeagleBone Green. On the PCB,
there are mainly resistor dividers, protection diodes, and an
SN74LVCH16245A [4] 16-Bit level shifter. The left side of
the PCB is connected to the outputs of the DuTs and the pin
header is mounted on the BeagleBone Green. With the logic
analyzer setup, influences on the control behavior of PLCs are
measured and logged.
E. Ping Response
To ensure network reachability during the tests, the ping
response of all devices is measured. This is done with a fping
[5] script every 100ms, which has been tested as a trade-off
between measuring accuracy and not influencing the devices
by flooding. If a network stack on a DuT crashes, it is detected
and logged.
F. Network Capture
To analyze tests in detail, a network capture of this period
is essential. The complete network traffic within the testbed is
mirrored on one port and captured with tcpdump [6] in a log
rotation. For example, if a device fails during an attack, the
timestamped and corresponding captures are used for further
investigation.
G. Visualization
Besides the logging, the measurement results are directly
visualized on monitors on the testbed. The cycle time [7] of
a Siemens S7-1211C during idle is illustrated in Fig. 4. But
this is not constant, because it is influenced by communication
and housekeeping during the execution. One scan cycle takes
from 140µs to 300µs during idle measurement. This can later
be compared with the scan cycle time during an attack, e.g.
to check if the DuT is being influenced.
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Fig. 4. Visualization of the Scan Cycle Time of a Siemens S7-1211C
Furthermore, the ping response, current test results, and
statistics of the network capture are visualized. This enables
a quick overview at any time.
H. Virtualized Devices
For the measurement of the response time of a command
sent over the network to the DuT, it is necessary to virtualize
components, e.g. sensors or other IIoT devices. The control
command (e.g. set an output over an industrial protocol) is sent
by the measurement VM, which reduces timing dependencies
during the measurement. Thereafter, the electrical output is
measured by the logic analyzer and is processed. In order
to send a command, the industrial protocol, e.g. BACnet and
Modbus, must be used and implemented into the test.
I. Input Signal Generation
To simulate electric input signals for the DuTs, these must
be generated to be read by real hardware. This is realized
with a Universal Serial Bus (USB)-to-serial converter. Both the
generated input and output signals of the DuT are measured
by the logic analyzer. The delay between them is the response
time. A jitter of this could be caused if, for example, the
DuT faces a high Central Processing Unit (CPU) load due
to network communication.
III. DUTS IN THE TESTBED
For the CoRT testbed, diverse vendors and products have
been chosen. With this, it is possible to compare implemen-
tations based on their security level from a technical point of
view. However, single devices can also be tested. Table I lists
currently employed devices with a selection of open ports.
A. Common Network Protocols
Industrial components often use common network protocols
for tasks such as monitoring and visualization. On the testbed,
we have the following common network protocols:
• File Transfer Protocol (FTP) ”Port: 21” is used for
file transfer. Within industrial networks, this is used for
logging and updating the firmware, for example.
• Secure Shell (SSH) ”22” refers to a network protocol
that can be used to securely communicate with a remote
device. It is often used to make a remote command line
available locally if, for example, the PLC runs Linux.
• Telnet ”23” is a client/server protocol that is based on a
character-oriented data exchange over a TCP connection.
PLCs could be partly configured over it.
• Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) ”80” is mainly
used to load web pages (hypertext files) into a web
browser. Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)
”443” uses an additional transport security. These are
used for the visualization of diagnostic information and
sensor values.
B. Industrial Network Protocols
In modern plants, fieldbuses are increasingly being replaced
by an IP-based communication system. Within CoRT, five
common industrial protocols on real hardware are available.
• The Modbus/TCP ”502” protocol is a communication
protocol based on a master/slave architecture.
• KNX IP ”3671” is mostly used for building automation.
• OPC Unified Architecture ”4840” is an industrial Ma-
chine to Machine (M2M) communication protocol that
works across manufacturers.
• Ethernet/IP ”44818” is a real-time Ethernet mainly used
in automation technology.
• BACnet/IP ”47808” is mostly used in building au-
tomation, ensuring interoperability between devices of
different manufacturers, if all partners agree on certain
building blocks defined by the standard.
C. Proprietary Network Protocols
Furthermore, there are proprietary protocols, which are
only partly understood. The S7comm ”102” protocol
is used by Siemens devices to communicate, for
example, with the Integrated Development Environment
(IDE) and HMIs. Moreover, other vendors use
proprietary protocols to program PLCs and HMIs
(Phoenix Contacts ”1962, 41100”, ABB ”1200, 1201”,
WinCC ”2308”, WAGO-Service-Protocol ”2455, 6626”,
Crouzet ”42424”, Codesys ”11740”). In terms of security,
these protocols are particularly interesting, because they
execute privileged commands, such as setting the run mode
of a device and updating the user application.
IV. EXPERIMENTS WITH CORT
With CoRT, a playground for researchers, organizations,
and academic collaborators is made available. It is nearly
impossible to make tests in an operating ICS, let alone change
hardware or software. Even if tests can be performed, the bulk
of the necessary data is not recorded and cannot be evaluated.
To evaluate different DuTs, predefined sequences of tests
are used. One of these test sequences is illustrated in Fig. 5.
After it starts, an automated power cycle of the DuT can be
done. This becomes necessary if previous tests have influenced
the DuT or if it does not recover, e.g. after a successful
Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Afterward, the measurement
begins, including network captures, continuous reachability
TABLE I
PLCS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED WITHIN THE TESTBED
Vendor Product Vendor No. IP Rack 1 IP Rack 2 Selection of Open Ports
Siemens CPU 1211C 6ES7211-1AE40-0XB0 192.168.0.10 192.168.0.110 80, 102, 443
Siemens KP 300 6AV6647-0AH11-3AX0 192.168.0.11 192.168.0.111 102, 2308
Phoenix ILC 151 2700974 192.168.0.20 192.168.0.120 21, 80, 1962, 41100
ABB PM554-T 1SAP120600R0071 192.168.0.21 192.168.0.121 21, 502, 1200, 1201
Crouzet em4 B26-2GS 88981133 192.168.0.22 192.168.0.122 502, 42424
Siemens LOGO! 24RCE 6ED1052-1CC01-0BA8 192.168.0.23 192.168.0.123 80, 102, 502, 8080
Wago Controller KNX IP 750-889 192.168.0.30 192.168.0.130 21, 80, 443, 502, 2455, 6626
Wago Controller PFC100 750-8100 192.168.0.31 192.168.0.131 22, 80, 443, 502, 4840, 6626,
11740
Wago Controller ETHERNET 750-880 192.168.0.32 192.168.0.132 21, 80, 443, 502, 2455, 6626,
44818
Wago Controller BACnet/IP 750-831 192.168.0.33 192.168.0.133 21, 80, 443, 502, 2455, 6626,
47808
Schneider TM221CE16T TM221CE16T 192.168.0.50 192.168.0.150 502, 44818
Schneider HMISTU855 HMISTU855 192.168.0.51 192.168.0.151 502, 6001
OpenPLC v2 [8] Raspberry Pi 3 Commit f1a2645 192.168.0.60 192.168.0.160 22, 502, 8080, 20000
Moxa NP5110 NP5110 192.168.0.70 192.168.0.170 23, 80, 443, 950, 966, 4900
check, and electrical output measurement. The measurement
process has three phases: (1) pre-idle, (2) attack, and (3) post-
idle monitoring.
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Test/Attack (2) Attack Measurement
(3) Post Measurement
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Fig. 5. Illustration of a Test Sequence
During the test/attack, the DuT is penetrated with different
kinds of network robustness tests and vulnerability scans.
Finally, the results are analyzed, logged, and are visualized on
the monitor. If additional tests are in the queue, the sequence
starts from the beginning until all tests are finished. It is
possible to perform a full test on a single device, or to
apply one test on every device in the rack. This depends on
the type of validation, such as fuzzing of a single protocol
on a device, which are not supported by other DuTs. Our
first measurements indicate that network traffic can influence
devices.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed testbed is a combination of network devices,
measurement equipment, and industrial components. It allows
studying ICS devices like PLCs, sensors, and HMIs in detail
without influencing real-world processes. Furthermore, the
testbed measurements are automatically recorded and ana-
lyzed, where new test scenarios can build up, without having
to worry about the measurement setup. With this testbed, a
basis for communication robustness tests has been built.
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